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DIAGNOSED WITH TIME IS MONEY: ARBITRARY MEDICARE
PROVISIONS DIFFERENTIATING OBSERVATION SERVICES
FROM INPATIENT ADMISSIONS VIOLATE BENEFICIARIES’
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
Stephanie Masaba*
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, an upward trend in the denials of Medicare reimbursement has trig-
gered heightened scrutiny of provisions governing coverage.1 A hospital service known
as “observation care” is one reason behind these increases. Observation care is when
a patient goes to the hospital, the doctor must determine the patient’s admission status
by evaluating the patient’s medical need.2 The doctor decides whether a patient shall
be admitted as an inpatient or discharged as an outpatient.3 For billing purposes, the
hospital may categorize a patient’s use of service as only observation care; a short-term
treatment and assessment service used to evaluate incoming patients.4 This type of
outpatient service that is “commonly ordered for patients who present to the emergency
department and who then require a significant period of treatment or monitoring in
order to make a decision concerning their admission or discharge.”5
While this triaging method serves as a legitimate tool to avoid unnecessary hospital
admissions, Medicare coverage for outpatient services comes at a cost for beneficiaries;6
outpatient coverage does not extend to any follow-up care, including skilled nursing
care and prescription costs.7 Medicare beneficiaries complain that the distinction
* J.D. Candidate 2015, William & Mary Law School; B.Hsc. 2011, University of Western
Ontario. I would like to thank my family and friends for celebrating this accomplishment with
me. I would also like to thank the staff members of the Bill of Rights Journal for their hard work.
1 Kristen Schorsch, Hospitals Play with Medicare Patients’ Status, MODERN HEALTHCARE
(Oct. 13, 2013, 8:45 AM), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article /20131013/INFO/31013
9984/hospitals-play-with-medicare-patients-status (“A growing number of senior citizens are en-
snared in a Medicare crackdown on hospitals over costly inpatient admissions. Hospitals nation-
wide are responding by classifying more overnight visitors as outpatients held for observation.”).
2 MEDICARE BENEFIT POLICY MANUAL (CMS Pub. 100-02), Ch. 6, §§ 20.6(A)–(B), avail-
able at http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/downloads/bp
102c06.pdf [hereinafter MEDICARE BENEFIT POLICY MANUAL].
3 Id. 
4 Id. § 20.6(A); see infra Part I.B.
5 MEDICARE BENEFIT POLICY MANUAL, supra note 2, at §§ 20.6(A)–(B).
6 With ICD-10, Expect Claim Denials to Rise, HEALTH CARE COLLECTOR, Aug. 2013,
at 3–4 (“Patients in observation care are not admitted to the hospital, so they face higher co-
payments, sometimes much higher out-of-pocket drug costs than admitted patients, and do
not qualify for nursing-home coverage.”).
7 Id.
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between inpatient status and observation status is not clear enough to result in the fair
categorization of patients in all cases.8 At times, this results in beneficiaries unfairly
being deemed ineligible for coverage despite their medical need. Unfortunately, most
beneficiaries, if not all, are left in complete darkness without any initial disclosure about
their admission status before being billed for a hospital visit.
The classification confusion stems from the arbitrary provisions that differentiate
outpatient and inpatient care. Doctors refuse to bear the blame because they believe that
current regulations and provisions lack the clarity needed to avoid misclassifying
patients.9 Hospitals blame their mistakes on the government’s auditing pressures,
which include heavy fines for failure to correctly classify patients on claim submis-
sions.10 In May 2013, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) re-
sponded to accumulating frustrations by proposing changes to the federal regulations
of Medicare Part A.11 The proposed changes will aim to solve ambiguous eligibility
criteria to make it easier to correctly classify inpatient admissions.12 In August 2013,
the CMS finalized changes, but the implementation of the new rules has been delayed
until March 31, 2015.13
This Note will argue that the proposed new changes to Medicare’s provisions of in-
patient admission lack the sufficiency necessary to protect beneficiaries from a Fifth
Amendment procedural Due Process rights violation. The background section will first
discuss Medicare and the outpatient service-observation care, then the Medicare appeals
process and current problems with the provisions governing inpatient and outpatient ad-
missions. The next part examines the Due Process Clause and established case law.
The discussion section will first show that all Medicare beneficiaries have an ex-
isting property interest because of governing provisions’ intent to reimburse benefi-
ciaries’ use of medical services, enrollees’ expectations, and the inability to easily
distinguish outpatients and inpatients. Next, federal oversight of the distribution of
Medicare benefits is strong enough to create federal action. Last, the appeals claim
system is an inadequate procedural safeguard due to its inability to review claims
in a timely manner. The last section will present several recommendations to make
8 See Schorsch, supra note 1.
9 See Bob Wachter, Medicare’s Observation Status—And Why Attempts to Make Things
Better May Make Them Worse, THE HEALTH CARE BLOG (July 30, 2013), http://www.the
healthcareblog.com/blog/2013/07/30/medicares-observation-status-and-why-attempts-to
-make-things-better-may-make-them-worse.
10 See infra Part I.D.
11 Medicare Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 27,486, 27,644 (proposed May 10, 2013) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 412, 462, 485, 489).
12 Id.
13 See id.; see also Kelly April Tyrrell, Delays, Controversy Muddle CMS’ Two-Midnight
Rule for Hospital Patient Admissions, THE HOSPITALIST (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.the-hospital
ist.org/article/delays-controversy-muddle-cms-two-midnight-rule-for-hospital-patient
-admissions/; Letter from Allyson Y. Schwartz et al. to Marilyn Tavenner (Sept. 24, 2013), avail-
able at http://www.forbes.house.gov/uploadedfiles/two_midnights_letter_to_cms_9_25.pdf.
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the new provisions more effective, including improving clarity of language and notice
to beneficiaries.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Medicare: A Principal Government Program for Healthcare
In 1965, Congress added amendments to the Social Security Act (SSA)14 to es-
tablish Medicare, a form of federal health insurance that aids with medical costs for
the elderly and disabled.15 Eligible citizens fall into three categories: (1) over 65 years
old; (2) under 65 years old with certain disabilities; and (3) anyone with End Stage
Renal Disease.16
Federal statutes, rules and regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, and numerous court decisions govern the administration of this com-
plex program.17 Various factors affect the distribution of the program’s benefits. The
extent of Medicare’s health care benefits (Coverage) provided for health and drug
services is based on three main factors: (1) federal and state laws; (2) national coverage
decisions that determine the exact services covered; and (3) local state coverage
decisions, made by claims processing companies, which decide the medical neces-
sity of a service and whether to provide coverage for that service in their area.18
To enroll in the Medicare program, one must go to a Social Security Office or
apply online.19 The Social Security Administration determines eligibility of appli-
cants and processes premium payments.20 The Department of Health and Human
Services oversees most agencies that aid with the facilitation and functioning of the
program.21 In the provisions of the SSA, the Secretary of Health and Human Services
has the authority to delegate most of her functional administration duties to medical
administrative entities.22 The entity that has the responsibility of assuming that role
14 See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2006); see also id. § 1395b-7 (2006).
15 MEDICARE EXPLAINED 15 (Nicole T. Stone ed., 2013).
16 Medicare Program—General Information, CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (July 25,
2014), http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-General-Information/MedicareGenInfo/index
.html (“End stage renal disease is a permanent kidney failure requiring dialysis or a kidney
transplant.”).
17 See, e.g., Medicare Law: An Overview, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu
/wex/medicare (last visited May 1, 2015).
18 What Does Medicare Part A Cover?, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/what
-medicare-covers/part-a/what-part-a-covers.html (last visited May 1, 2015).
19 See When & How To Sign Up For Part A & Part B, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www
.medicare.gov/sign-up-change-plans/get-parts-a-and-b/when-how-to-sign-up-for-part-a-and
-part-b.html (last visited May 1, 2015).
20 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395s (2006); SOC. SEC. ADMIN., MEDICARE (2013), available at
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/pubs/EN-05-10043.pdf.
21 TERRY S. COLEMAN, MEDICARE LAW 5 (2001).
22 42 U.S.C. § 1395kk-1 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(a) (2012); COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 5.
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is the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (formerly known as the Health Care
Financing Administration).23 The Office of the Inspector General (OIG), provides over-
sight over the operations of the Department of Health and Human Services, as well
as ensuring the health and welfare of program beneficiaries.24 The OIG achieves
these means by investigating fraud and abuse allegations, as well as recommending
program changes.25
Initially, the structure of Medicare consisted of two programs, Medicare Part A
and Medicare Part B, but later included two additional programs—Part C and Part
D.26 For purposes of discussion in this Note, the focus will only be on the original
two parts. Part A of Title 42 of the SSA, officially known as “Hospital Insurance Bene-
fits for Aged and Disabled,” covers important hospital and other institutional provider
care costs.27 More specifically it covers inpatient care including: critical access to hos-
pitals, skilled nursing facilities, hospice, and some home health services.28 Generally,
beneficiaries do not need to pay a premium fee, and their benefits depend on whether
certain conditions are satisfied.29
Medicare is a costly program. Today, the program covers over fifty million seniors,
and that number is likely to grow with an aging baby boomer population.30 Funding
for the program comes primarily from the following sources: federal general revenues
(40%), payroll tax contributions (38%), and beneficiary premiums (13%).31 Other
sources include state payments, social security benefit taxes, and interest.32 In general,
payroll taxes provide payments for coverage: payments may come directly from em-
ployers, employees, or those self-employed.33 These taxes are invested in trust funds.34
The Hospital Insurance Fund (HI Fund) accumulates funds to cover Part A ser-
vices, while Part B draws funding from the Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust
23 42 U.S.C. § 1395kk-1; 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(a); HARVEY L. MCCORMICK, 1 MEDICARE &
MEDICAID CLAIMS AND PROCEDURES, at 26 (4th ed. 2005); COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 5.
24 About Us, OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., http://oig.hhs.gov/about-oig/about-us/index.asp (last
visited May 1, 2015).
25 See COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 5; About Us, supra note 24.
26 MEDICARE EXPLAINED, supra note 15, at 15.
27 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2006); MEDICARE EXPLAINED, supra note 15, at 15.
28 COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 1.
29 Medicare Program—General Information, supra note 16.
30 David Morgan, Medicare’s Political Importance Goes Beyond Seniors, REUTERS (Aug. 31,
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/31/us-usa-campaign-medicare-idUSBRE87
U06F20120831.
31 See The Facts on Medicare Spending and Financing, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (July 28,
2014), http://kff.org/medicare/fact-sheet/medicare-spending-and-financing-fact-sheet/.
32 Id.
33 COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 1.
34 Id. at 2 (“[T]rust fund structure and its accumulation of interest are essentially an ac-
counting device to track an obligation to raise funds in future years through taxation or
borrowing . . . .”).
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Fund (SMI Fund).35 The HI Fund collects money from a 2.9% tax on employee earn-
ings. This tax increases for higher-income taxpayers.36 This makes the HI Fund largely
dependent on the size of the workforce and at risk of possible insolvency within the
next ten years.37 Part B does not face such a risk because the SMI Fund relies primarily
on federal general revenues (73%) and enrollee premiums (25%).38 Outside of general
revenues, the federal government also makes large contributions as an employer of
enrollees who are federal employees.39
Medicare Part B, also known as “Supplementary Medical Insurance Benefits for
the Aged and Disabled,” is a voluntary program that covers services and supplies if
deemed medically necessary.40 Coverage includes physician costs, outpatient care,
other healthcare practitioner services like physical therapy or occupational therapy,
and items and supplies not covered under the basic program.41 Enrollees usually pay
for coverage through monthly premiums.42 Funding is also supported by contribu-
tions from the federal government.43 As one could easily gather, presently, Medicare
(along with Medicaid44) costs the government billions of dollars, but it is an impor-
tant program servicing millions of American citizens.45 Unfortunately, this funding is
not readily replaceable and so the well may dry soon.
35 See Emily Robinson, How Medicare is Funded, ONLINE NEWSHOUR, http://www.pbs
.org/newshour/health/medicare/financing.html (last visited May 1, 2015); The Facts on Medi-
care Spending and Financing, supra note 31.
36 See HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND., THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT THREE YEARS POST-
ENACTMENT (2013), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013
/04/84291.pdf [hereinafter KAISER FOUNDATION].
37 Robinson, supra note 35. It is expected that by 2026, partially as a result of the baby
boomer generation retiring and a shrinking workforce, funds will be either depleted or close
to it. Id.
38 These numbers are based on a 2014 study. See The Facts on Medicare Spending and
Financing, supra note 31; see also Robinson, supra note 35; COMM. WAYS & MEANS, THE
PRESIDENT’S AND OTHER BIPARTISAN PROPOSALS TO REFORM MEDICARE: MODERNIZING
BENEFICIARY COST-SHARING (2013), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploaded
files/modernizing_cost-sharing_summary.pdf. The Affordable Care Act has frozen income-
related premium thresholds until 2019, likely increasing the number of beneficiaries paying
a higher premium. The Facts on Medicare Spending and Financing, supra note 31.
39 These payments by the government are known as “intragovernmental transfers.”
Robinson, supra note 35.
40 MEDICARE EXPLAINED, supra note 15, at 15; Medicare Part B, CTRS. MEDICARE & MED-
ICAID SERVS. (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-General-Information
/MedicareGenInfo/Part-B.html.
41 MEDICARE EXPLAINED, supra note 15, at 15; Medicare Part B, supra note 40.
42 MEDICARE EXPLAINED, supra note 15, at 15; Medicare Part B, supra note 40.
43 MEDICARE EXPLAINED, supra note 15, at 15.
44 Medicaid will not be discussed in this Note; it is a type of federally mandated health in-
surance targeting specific population groups, like Medicare, except that States establish and
administer the programs themselves. See Vikki Wachino, About Us, MEDICAID.GOV, http://
www.medicaid.gov/about-us/about-us.html (last visited May 1, 2015).
45 See MCCORMICK, supra note 23, at 7–8.
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B. Inpatient Versus Outpatient: What Is Observation Care?
One way the federal government attempts to constrain costs is by restricting cover-
age of services. A patient’s hospital status will affect the amount of coverage avail-
able to her, as well as whether that coverage will extend to post-discharge treatments
(i.e., nursing care, prescriptions, etc.).46 This determination stems from the initial dis-
cretion of an examining doctor.47 That doctor decides if a patient receives “inpatient”
or “outpatient” care.48 If labeled as an inpatient, then a physician formally admits the
patient to the hospital under a doctor’s order.49 The length of stay begins on the day of
admission and continues until the day before a patient is discharged.50 If the services
used satisfy Part A provisions, then a patient must only pay a one-time deductible for
those services within the first sixty days in the hospital.51 Under Part B, a deductible
constitutes 20% of the Medicare-approved amount for doctor services after paying
the initial Part B deductible.52
Conversely, outpatient services include emergency department services, observa-
tion services, outpatient surgery, lab tests, and x-rays, but the doctor does not write an
order to admit the patient to the hospital.53 Therefore, despite receiving similar treatment
and services as an admitted inpatient, maybe even joining inpatients in overnight stays
and/or having a similar length of stay, one is still deemed an outpatient.54 Part B pro-
vides provisions to govern the coverage of outpatient services. Patients must pay co-
payments for each individual service.55 Just as in the case of inpatient services covered
under Part B, a beneficiary will pay 20% after paying a deductible.56 In most cases,
coverage will not extend to prescription and over-the-counter drugs.57 Also, care from
a Skilled Nursing Facility58 is only covered if one is admitted as an inpatient and stays
46 See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text; CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
ARE YOU A HOSPITAL INPATIENT OR OUTPATIENT? 4 (2014), available at https://www
.medicare.gov/Pubs/pdf/11435.
47 ARE YOU A HOSPITAL INPATIENT OR OUTPATIENT?, supra note 46, at 1.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 2.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 1.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 2.
56 Id.
57 Id. Patients may have coverage under Part D; however, a patient may still have to pay
out-of-pocket first and claim refund afterwards. Id.
58 A Skilled Nursing Facility is a nursing home which provides skilled care for the “injured,
sick, or disabled.” What Are Skilled Nursing Facilities?, SKILLEDNURSINGFACILITIES.ORG,
http://www.skillednursingfacilities.org/resources/what-are-skilled-nursing-facilities/ (last visited
May 1, 2015). The care delivered to patients includes chronic illness management, medication
monitoring, physical or occupational therapy, and even specialized care for incurable diseases
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in the hospital for a minimum of three consecutive days.59 Moreover, co-payments
per service under Medicare Part B may be greater than inpatient deductibles, and there-
fore, an outpatient’s total co-payment for all services used may still be more than the
inpatient’s total deductible.60
Patients often utilize an outpatient service called “observation care” (also known
as observation stay and observation service). Consisting of a well-defined set of spe-
cific, clinically appropriate services, observation care involves a physician evaluating
whether to decide if a patient should be admitted to hospital as an inpatient or whether
to provide observation services only.61 Physicians use short-term treatments and as-
sessments to make a determination.62 Assessments include reviewing a patient’s prior
medical history, the severity of symptoms, and evaluating the expected care. CMS
policy requires physicians to make a conclusive decision within twenty-four hours, and
in more difficult cases, within a maximum of forty-eight hours.63 The doctor’s final
decision will affect the amount of reimbursements for both physicians and patients.
Hospitals receive payments for observation service through the Outpatient Prospec-
tive Payment System (OPPS).64 OPPS bases costs on the number of services used by
each individual beneficiary, therefore, the more services used by the beneficiary the
more he will need to pay.65 In contrast, the Inpatient Prospective Payment System
(IPPS) is not dependent on the number of services provided or the length of stay; pay-
ment is based on the cost of caring for an average beneficiary.66 Policymakers recognize
that “[b]eneficiaries who are treated for extended periods of time as hospital outpa-
tients receiving observation services may incur greater financial liability than they
would if they were admitted as hospital inpatients.”67
In instances when observation care is warranted it can serve as an effective way to
limit unnecessary medical treatment. On the other hand, without sound basis, it can un-
fairly disadvantage patients. Several Medicare advocates criticize observation care
for just being an arbitrary labeling of patients because both in- and out-patients may
like Alzheimer’s. Id. Eighty-four percent of the 1.9 million nursing beds are Medicare cer-
tified. See Nursing Home Statistics, SPECIALTY HOSPITALS AM., www.specialtyhospitalsof
america.com/news/nursing-home-statistics-2/ (last visited May 1, 2015).
59 ARE YOU A HOSPITAL INPATIENT OR OUTPATIENT?, supra note 46, at 4.
60 Id. at 2.
61 Medicare Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 27,486, 27,644, (proposed May 10, 2013) (to be codi-
fied at 42 C.F.R. pts. 412, 462, 485, 489); STUART WRIGHT, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN.,
MEMORANDUM REPORT: HOSPITALS’ USE OF OBSERVATION STAYS AND SHORT INPATIENT
STAYS FOR MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES 2 (2013), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports
/oei-02-12-00040.pdf.
62 WRIGHT, supra note 61, at 2.
63 Id. at 2.
64 Id. at 4.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Medicare Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 27,466, 27,644 (proposed May 10, 2013) (to be codified
at 42 C.F.R. pts. 412, 485, 489).
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stay in the hospital for days and nights, while often receiving very similar treatments.68
Advocates believe that the “care for . . . outpatients is often indistinguishable from the
care provided to individuals who are called inpatients.”69 This ambiguity is prevalent
enough that most beneficiaries do not know anything about their status until the bill
comes in the mail, leaving them with only the option to formally dispute the claim.
C. Appeals: Mechanisms to Dispute Claim Determinations
Sometimes, when a beneficiary receives a processed claim receipt that beneficiary
may not agree with the amount of coverage received for use of a particular service.
Several mechanisms and procedures allow beneficiaries to dispute any claims deter-
mined under Part A and/or Part B. A beneficiary may appeal to either request a ser-
vice, supply, item, or prescription he feels entitled to, or request a payment for services,
supplies, etc. already received, or change the amount he is required to pay.70 Provi-
sions found in both the SSA and the Federal Register govern a five-level claim appeals
system for beneficiaries.71 The levels of the appeals process are as follows:
1. Redetermination by a CMS contractor (carrier, fiscal intermediary or
Medicare Administrative Contractor),
2. Reconsideration by a Qualified Independent Contractor,
3. Hearings before an Administrative Law Judge within the Office of Medi-
care Hearings and Appeals in the Department of Health and Human
Services,
4. Review by the Appeals Council within the Departmental Appeals Board
in the Department of Health and Human Services, and
5. Judicial review in federal district court.72
Beneficiaries can submit a written appeal request only after an initial claim determi-
nation has been processed by a Medicare designated billing company.73 The claim
receipt and other accompanying documents provide the necessary information about
the appeals process to recipients.74
68 See CMS Addresses Observation Status Again . . . And Again, No Help for Beneficiaries,
CTRS. MEDICARE ADVOC., INC., http://www.medicareadvocacy.org/cms-addresses-observa
tions-status-again-and-again-no-help-for-beneficiaries/ (last visited May 1, 2015) [hereinafter
CMS Addresses Observation Status].
69 Id.
70  CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE APPEALS 5 (2013), available at
http://www.medicare.gov/Pubs/pdf/11525.pdf [hereinafter MEDICARE APPEALS].
71 Determinations, Redeterminations, Reconsiderations, and Appeals Under Original Medi-
care (Part A and Part B), 42 C.F.R. § 405, Subpart I (2013); ARE YOU A HOSPITAL INPATIENT
OR OUTPATIENT?, supra note 46; see Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396ff (2012).
72 MEDICARE APPEALS, supra note 70, at 9; How Do I File An Appeal If I Have Original
Medicare?, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/claims-and-appeals/file-an-appeal
/original-medicare/original-medicare-appeals.html (last visited May 1, 2015).
73 MEDICARE APPEALS, supra note 70, at 9.
74 Original Medicare Appeals—Level 1: Redetermination by the Company that Handles
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The first level of the process involves a review of the initial claim by contractor
staff—a group of new individuals who did not participate in the original claim deter-
mination.75 The appeal must be made within 120 days of receiving the claim receipt,
and usually the contractor staff completes its review within 60 days.76 If a beneficiary
is not satisfied with the redetermination, then he may appeal to the second level within
180 days.77 The Quality Improvement Organization (QIO)78 conducts an independent
review of both the initial determination and subsequent redetermination.79 The QIO may
invite an accompanying panel of physicians or other health care professionals to review
the issues regarding the medical necessity of care.80 The Office of Medical Hearings
and Appeals oversees the third level.81 This stage is only available for claims with $150
or more left in controversy.82 An Administrative Law Judge conducts an independent
review of the facts and listens to testimony before making a new or impartial deci-
sion.83 The judge may decide the case on-record if the beneficiary waives his right to
a hearing or when the evidence supports a finding in clear favor of the beneficiary.84
If a beneficiary is not satisfied with the judge’s decision, then he can appeal to the
Appeals Council within sixty days—the second-to-last appeal level.85 The Council will
review the judge’s decision and the specific issues contested before issuing its own
Claims for Medicare, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/claims-and-appeals/file-an
-appeal/original-medicare/original-medicare-appeals-level-1.html (last visited May 1, 2015).
75 Id.; MEDICARE APPEALS, supra note 70, at 12.
76 Original Medicare Appeals—Level 1: Redetermination by the Company that Handles
Claims for Medicare, supra note 74; MEDICARE APPEALS, supra note 70, at 10–11.
77 Original Medicare Appeals—Level 1: Redetermination by the Company that Handles
Claims for Medicare, supra note 74; MEDICARE APPEALS, supra note 70, at 11.
78 The Quality Improvement Organization is “[a] group of practicing doctors and other health
care experts paid by the Federal government to check and improve the care given to people
with Medicare.” Benefits Overview, FAMILY CARE, INC. (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.family
careinc.org/indexphp?/01.main/benefits-overview.
79 MEDICARE APPEALS, supra note 70, at 11–13.
80 Id. at 12–13. At this stage, beneficiaries must submit all supporting evidence, otherwise
they might waive the opportunity to bring in additional corroborating evidence in later stages
without a showing of good cause. Id.
81 Office of Medical Hearings and Appeals (OMHA), U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/omha/ (last visited May 1, 2015).
82 Third Level of Appeal: Hearing by an Administrative Law Judge, CMS.GOV, http://cms
.gov/Medicare/Appeals-and-Grievances/OrgMedFFSAppeals/HearingsALJ/html (last visited
May 1, 2015). The threshold of controversy is determined “annually by the percentage in the
medical care component of the consumer price index for all urban consumers.” See Level-
Five Appeal, AM. HOSPITAL ASSOC., http://www.aha.org/advocacy-issues/medicare/appeals
/level-five.shtml (last visited May 1, 2015).
83 MEDICARE APPEALS, supra note 70, at 13. Usually the review is conducted by phone
or video teleconference; in some cases the judge may grant an in-person hearing. Id.
84 Id. at 13.
85 Appeals—Level 3: Hearing Before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), MEDICARE.GOV,
http://www.medicare.gov/claims-and-appeals/file-an-appeal/appeals-level-3.html (last visited
May 1, 2015).
1194 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 23:1185
decision.86 The final level of appeal is having the claim reviewed in a federal district
court.87 A beneficiary must file an appeal within sixty days of receiving a decision from
the Appeals Council, and at least $1,460 must be remaining in controversy.88 As intri-
cate as this appeals process appears to be, in reality it is not an efficient and desirable
process, as discussed later in this Note.
D. Problems with Observation Care: Provisions Lack Clarity
Various reports and studies conclude that the use of outpatient services is increas-
ing, while inpatient admissions are decreasing. The Medicare Payment Advisory Com-
mission,89 reported in its March 2013 report to Congress, that “[b]etween 2006 and
2011, observation visits increased from 28 visits per 1,000 Part B beneficiaries to
approximately 47 visits per 1,000, a nearly 65 percent increase in visits over the pe-
riod.”90 Also, the Center for Medicare Advocacy supports this observation with its
findings that “not only has the percentage of patients in observation nearly tripled, but
the total number of observation stays of any duration also increased by nearly 50% over
the same five-year period.”91
The ruckus surrounding the observation care provisions has also caught the atten-
tion of several members of Congress. As of March 2013, two bills titled “Improving
Access to Medicare Coverage of 2013" were submitted to both the Senate and House
of Representatives.92 This bipartisan pending legislation proposes that days spent in
86 MEDICARE APPEALS, supra note 70, at 15–16.
87 Id. at 16.
88 Id. at 16. The $1,460 represents the official current controversy threshold set for 2015. Id.
89 About MedPAC, MEDPAC, http://www.medpac.gov/-about-medpac- (last visited May 1,
2015) (“The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) is an independent congres-
sional agency established by the Balanced Budget Act . . . to advise the U.S. Congress on issues
affecting the Medicare program.”).
90 MEDPAC, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 48 (2013), available
at http://www.medpac.gov/documents/Mar13_entirereport.pdf?sfvrsn=0.
91 CMS Addresses Observation Status, supra note 68.
92 S. 569, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 1179, 113th Cong. (2013). Ohio Democrat Senator
Sherrod Brown introduced the Senate Bill, and he has already successfully pushed for initiatives
that enable seniors to receive free screenings and other preventive services and changes that re-
duce prescription drug costs. See generally Standing Up for Seniors, SHERROD BROWN,
http://www.sherrodbrown.com/issues/standing-up-for-seniors/ (last visited May 1, 2015). Con-
gressman Joe Courtney, a Connecticut Democrat, and Congressman Tom Latham, an Iowa
Republican, introduced the House bill. See H.R. 1179. Congressman Courtney’s initiatives to
make Medicare coverage more inclusive have garnered a lot of attention. See generally Press
Release, Congressman Joe Courtney, Commission on Long-Term Care Recommends Courtney-
Sponsored Modifications to Three-Day Hospital Stay Requirement for Skilled Nursing Care
Coverage in Medicare (Oct. 4, 2013), http://courtney.house.gov/press-releases/commission-on
-longterm-care-recommends-courtneysponsored-modifications-to-threeday-hospital-stay
-requirement-for-skilled-nursing-care-coverage-in-medicare/. Also, Congressman Latham has
participated in discussions to strengthen Medicare and ensure enrollees continue to receive
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observation care should not be excluded from, but count towards inpatient stay re-
quirements instead.93
In 2013, the CMS responded to this growing disparity between inpatient and out-
patient services and its effect on beneficiaries’ coverage. The CMS acknowledged
that “the number of cases of Medicare beneficiaries receiving observation services for
more than 48 hours . . . has increased from approximately 3 percent in 2006 to approxi-
mately 8 percent in 2011.”94 The CMS is concerned that despite the readily available
information it provides about beneficiaries’ financial liability and services, there still
seems to be confusion about how governing regulations work.95 This is because of its
findings that “at least some of these outpatient observation visits would have been
short inpatient stays in the past; during the corresponding time period (2006 to 2011),
the number of inpatient stays lasting one day declined by more than 15 percent.”96
The original provisions of the SSA required a prior three-day hospital inpatient
stay for coverage of services, including Skilled Nursing Facility care, under Medicare
Part A.97 A specific number of days and nights seems like a very straight forward,
bright line rule for eligibility, but several other factors have made application of the rule
not so black and white. In the new proposed rules of 2013, the CMS discussed how the
revisions of the old provisions of observation care, “may be attributable in part to hos-
pitals’ concerns about Medicare’s payment policy for billing under Part B when a
Part A hospital inpatient claim is denied because a Medicare review contractor deter-
mines that the inpatient admission was not reasonable and necessary under section
1862(a)(1)(A) of the Act.”98 Why the concern from hospitals? Because provisions limit
the number of ancillary inpatient services that can be paid for by Medicare.99 The CMS
recognized that the drafting of the provisions, coupled with oversight from auditing pro-
grams, seemed to be driving hospitals’ response to “the financial risk of admitting
Medicare beneficiaries for inpatient stays that may later be denied upon contractor re-
view by electing to treat beneficiaries as outpatients receiving observation services,
often for long periods of time, rather than admitting them as inpatients.”100 So, the
CMS proposed new clarified rules governing hospital inpatient admissions, “[t]o
reduce uncertainty regarding the requirements for payments to hospitals and CAHs
much needed services. See generally Press Release, Congressman Tom Latham, Latham Meets
With Iowa Representatives of AARP to Discuss Medicare and Social Security (Jun. 20, 2012),
http://www.legistorm.com/stormfeed/view-rss/390302/member/331.html.
93 S. 569, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 1179, 113th Cong. (2013).
94 Medicare Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 27,644 (proposed May 10, 2013) (to be codified at
42 C.F.R. pts. 412, 462, 485, 489).
95 Id. (“[W]e have published educational materials for beneficiaries to inform them of
their respective liabilities as a hospital outpatient or inpatient.”).
96 MEDPAC, supra note 90, at 48.
97 78 Fed. Reg. 27,644; Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(i).
98 78 Fed. Reg. 27,644.
99 Id.
100 Id.
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under Medicare Part A.”101 The goal is that the clarification will “reduce the frequency
of extended observation care when it may be inappropriately furnished.”102
The new rule proposal of 2013 generously adjusts the time presumption needed to
qualify for inpatient admission. The CMS proposes “hospital inpatient admissions
spanning [two] midnights in the hospital would generally qualify as appropriate for
payment under Medicare Part A.”103 Moreover, if a stay lasts less than two nights, then
such a stay will be deemed as “‘generally inappropriate for inpatient admission and
inpatient payment under Medicare Part A,’ unless the surgical procedure is ‘specified
by Medicare as inpatient only under §419.22(n).’”104
One aspect that remains the same is the doctor will still continue to have sole dis-
cretion in making the initial determination of a patient’s classification by issuing a
completed, signed, and documented certified admission order.105 Physician certification
will require the doctor “to certify the reasons for the hospitalization, the estimated time
the patient will remain in the hospital, and ‘plans for post-hospital care, if appropri-
ate.’”106 However, this certification will not serve as a conclusive determination of a pa-
tient’s eligibility; the CMS still reserves the right to review the order “in the context of
the evidence in the medical record.”107
II. DENYING BENEFITS: DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND
PROTECTED PROPERTY INTERESTS
The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibits the federal government from
depriving citizens of “life, liberty, or property” without the due process of law.108 The
Due Process Clause ensures citizens justice by shielding them from unlawful acts by
the government.109 Therefore, the government at all times must adhere to enforceable
rules and established procedures.110 This includes not creating laws and regulations
101 Id. at 27,496.
102 Observation Status: New Final Rules from CMS Do Not Help Medicare Beneficiaries,
CTR. FOR MEDICARE ADVOCACY, INC. (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.medicareadvocacy.org
/observation-status-new-final-rules-from-cms-do-not-help-medicare-beneficiaries/
[hereinafter Observation Status].
103 78 Fed. Reg. 27,496 (emphasis added).
104 See Observation Status, supra note 102.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. (There is no provision which elaborates that “CMS intends to provide additional
information about what ‘evidence in the medical record’ means in future instructions and
manual revisions.”).
108 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for. . .nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.” (emphasis added)); see Fifth Amendment: Due Process, BILL
OF RIGHTS INST., http://billofrightsinstitute.org/resources/educator-resources/americapedia
/americapedia-bill-of-rights/fifth-amendment/due-process/ (last visited May 1, 2015).
109 Fifth Amendment: Due Process, supra note 108.
110 Id.
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which deny citizens their rights as protected by the Bill of Rights.111 In a procedural due
process claim, the court will look to see if the facts support three elements: (1) an exist-
ing property interest, (2) state action deprived due process, (3) and insufficient pro-
cedural protections.112
A. Procedural Due Process: The Protected Interest
When evaluating procedural Due Process challenges, courts must first determine
if a protected interest exists.113 Such an interest may be a “property” interest. Some
Americans consider property the “foundation of every right we have.”114 There are
two types of property right claims: (1) a defensive claim which is an act to keep what
one already possesses (or has title over), or (2) an offensive claim which is an act to
get something being possessed by someone else.115 So, a citizen can demand from
the government the release of “property” to whom the government claimed that citi-
zen would be entitled. For several decades, the Supreme Court has held that statutory
benefits distributed by the government may constitute a protected property interest.116
For example, in Goldberg v. Kelly, welfare recipients challenged termination proce-
dures of their public assistance payments. The Supreme Court deemed federal welfare
assistance a property interest—“[s]uch benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement
for persons qualified to receive them.”117 Also, in Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court found
that procedural due process is applicable to the terminations of Social Security disability
benefits.118 An individual’s interest “in the continued receipt of [such] benefits is a
statutorily created ‘property’ interest protected by the Fifth Amendment.”119
111 Id.
112 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1975).
113 Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59 (1999) (“The first inquiry in
every due process challenge is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a protected interest
in ‘property’ or ‘liberty.’”).
114 CATO INST., HANDBOOK FOR POLICYMAKERS 346 (7th ed. 2009) (“It is no accident that
a nation conceived in liberty and dedicated to justice for all protects property rights.”).
115 Id.
116 E.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). The Goldberg opinion includes a foot-
note which explains nicely why in a changing society, property can no longer refer to only
real property:
It may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more like
“property” than a “gratuity.” Much of the existing wealth in this country
takes the form of rights that do not fall within traditional common-law
concepts of property . . . .[S]ociety today is built around entitlement . . . .
Many of the most important of these entitlements now flow from gov-
ernment: subsidies to farmers and businessmen . . . social security
pensions for individuals. Such sources of security . . .to the recipients [ ]
are essentials . . . .
Id. at 262 (citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted).
117 Id. at 262.
118 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
119 Id.
1198 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 23:1185
Medicare beneficiaries can also enjoy similar protected rights to recover their
medical benefits from the government. However, that protected property right is only
granted when beneficiaries can successfully prove that a “legitimate entitlement” ex-
ists. The governing provisions would need to indicate explicitly that a certain outcome
must follow from a certain set of satisfied criteria.120
B. Procedural Due Process: A State Action
To consider a due process claim, the court must be able to hold a state or federal
actor accountable for a private act. Case law states that no formal test has been es-
tablished to aid courts with determining whether a private act is fairly attributable
to a state or federal actor.121 However, the Supreme Court uses other ways to deter-
mine the responsible actor.122 For example, in Blum v. Yaretsky, the patients had the
burden of showing a “close nexus” between the state and the challenged act of the
regulated entity.123 Even if a private actor commits an act, the state can still be held
responsible if that private actor is subject to the state’s coercive power.124 Coercive
power may be found if the state overtly or covertly encourages the private actor to
such an extent that it might as well be the state doing the action.125 State action may
also be found if the acts taken are considered to be “traditionally the exclusive pre-
rogative of the State.”126 Monteleone v. United Concordia Companies summarizes
other tests used by the Supreme Court including whether the private actor is a “willful
participant in joint activity with the State or its agents,”127 whether the actor is an
120 See Bagnall v. Sebelius, No. 3:11CV703, 2013 WL 5346659, at *20 (D. Conn. Sept. 23,
2013) (“‘[E]ntitlement to the benefit occurs only when official discretion is so narrowly con-
fined as to virtually guarantee conferral of the benefit.’” (quoting Furlong v. Shalala, 156
F.3d 384, 3994 (2d Cir. 1998))).
121 Monteleone v. United Concordia Cos., No. 09-1114, 2010 WL 653928, at *3 (W.D. Pa.
Feb. 19, 2010) (“There is no single or uniform test to determine if a private act may be at-
tributable to the state; however, the United States Supreme Court has developed several
frameworks for determining this question . . . .”).
122 Id. In Bowles v. Willingham, the Supreme Court explained that regardless of whether
a claim is for a Fifth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment violation, the alleged actor will
be held to the same standard. 321 U.S. 503, 518 (1944) (“[T]he restraints imposed on the na-
tional government in this regard by the Fifth Amendment are no greater than those imposed
on the States by the Fourteenth.”).
123 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
124 Id.; Monteleone, 2010 WL 653928, at *3 (“[A] challenged activity may be state action
when it results from the State’s exercise of ‘coercive power’. . . .” (citations omitted)).
125 Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004. As Blum further explains, this action must be significant and
cannot be just “[m]ere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives of a private party . . . .”
Id. at 1004–05.
126 Id. at 1005 (citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted).
127 Monteleone, 2010 WL 653928, at *3 (citations omitted); see Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982) (“[W]e have consistently held that a private party’s joint partic-
ipation with state officials in the seizure of disputed property is sufficient to characterize that
party as a ‘state actor’ . . . .”).
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agency of the state and therefore the agency acts are regarded as state acts,128 or
whether the private conduct is so “entwined with governmental policies.”129
C. Procedural Due Process: Procedural Protection and the Mathews Test
In Mathews, the Supreme Court addressed whether the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment requires that prior to any termination of Social Security bene-
fits, the affected beneficiary must be afforded the opportunity to dispute the claim
in an evidentiary hearing.130 The Supreme Court developed a balancing test to de-
termine whether sufficient protections exist to ensure that procedural due process
rights are not unnecessarily violated.131 The Court’s analysis for deciding whether
or not sufficient protections exist, examines the following three factors: (1) the af-
fected private interest, (2) the erroneous deprivation of such interest by existing proce-
dures and probable value of additional or substitute procedural safeguards, and (3) the
government’s interest.132
The first element—the affected private interest, describes the injury that the bene-
ficiary would want to avoid as a result of not receiving benefits. For example, in
Mathews the Supreme Court found that someone receiving Social Security payments
would have an interest in an “uninterrupted receipt of this source of income.”133 The
private interest is not only limited to a financial need for survival, such as in the case
of welfare recipients, but under certain circumstances it may also extend to a need
to cover astronomical costs of crucial medical services.134
The second element—the risk of erroneous deprivation, examines procedural
measures used to give a beneficiary notice of any termination or revocation of
benefits.135 The court assesses various factors to decide if the degree of deprivation
128 Monteleone, 2010 WL 635928, at *3; see Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, 353 U.S.
230, 231 (1957) (holding that despite acting as trustees, a board’s actions were discrimination
by the state because that board was an agency of the state).
129 Monteleone, 2010 WL 635928, at *3. In Evans v. Newton, the court referred to the
same example in Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, where the city could not dissociate its
acts from the state merely because it was acting as in the capacity of trustee of a private will.
382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966) (“A town may be privately owned and managed, but that does not
necessarily allow the company to treat it as if it were wholly in the private sector.”).
130 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 323 (1976).
131 Id. at 322; Grijalva v. Shalala, 152 F.3d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1998).
132 Shalala, 152 F.3d at 1121–23.
133 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 340; see also Shalala, 152 F.3d at 1121–23.
134 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 340 (“[T]he degree of potential deprivation that may be
created by a particular decision is a factor to be considered . . . .”); Kraemer v. Heckler, 737
F.2d 214, 222 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that if a beneficiary has to solely bear medical costs
then it is likely that the beneficiary will not choose to continue receiving medical care); Vorster
v. Bowen, 709 F. Supp. 934, 946 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (explaining that obtaining reimbursement
for medical bills is a fairly great private interest).
135 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343.
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is unlawful. In the case of Medicare claims, this would involve evaluating the suffi-
ciency of the claim appeals system. For example, the burdening impact of such dep-
rivation may be unnecessarily increased because a lengthy delay exists between a
beneficiary’s request for a hearing and the rendering of a final decision from the
appropriate agent or judge.136 Or, sometimes other available forms of assistance or
resources for the beneficiary may serve as an adequate substitution for the deprived
due process.137
The Court also evaluates the sources used by an actor to make a claim determi-
nation to see if their use results in fair and reliable procedural measures. For exam-
ple, the use of written sources is examined for their credibility.138 The writing should
have an underlying objective basis, like a medical report from a licensed physician,
as opposed to being a wholly subjective narrative.139 The Mathews Court noted though
that “procedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-
finding process as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions.”140
The final element of the Mathews test is the government’s interest, as well as the
public’s interest.141 Various factors are considered including the administrative burdens
and societal costs of requiring an evidentiary hearing before benefits are terminated.142
Adding additional safeguards must be reasonable and a reflection of the government’s
interest in using resources efficiently and not overspending public funds.143 This must
be balanced against the competing interest of not wanting to unjustifiably increase out-
of-pocket expenses for recipients who are entitled to receive available benefits.144
III. DISCUSSION
A. Denying Benefits: Procedural Due Process Violations of
Medicare Beneficiaries
As discussed previously, anyone bringing a due process claim must show that
government action deprived him of a property interest without due process of law.145
The Supreme Court has recognized Medicare benefits and other government benefits
existing property interests that may be subject to due process.146 However, such a
136 Id. at 341–42.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 343–44.
139 Id. at 344.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 347.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 347–48.
144 Id. at 348.
145 Bagnall v. Sebelius, No. 3:11CV1703 MPS, 2013 WL 5346659, at *20 (D. Conn.
Sept. 23, 2013).
146 Id.
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property interest will only exist if “one has a ‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ to the
benefit.”147 In the case of Medicare benefits, the courts will not necessarily find that
simply being enrolled in the program is sufficient to establish that necessary entitle-
ment. As explained in Perry v. Sindermann, “mere subjective ‘expectancy’ is [not]
protected by procedural due process.”148 But, the claimant still has the chance to prove
to the court otherwise. A property interest may still be recognized if it is proven that
“the legitimacy of his claim of such entitlement [exists] in light of ‘the policies and
practices [of the particular assistance program] . . . .’”149
1. A Legitimate Property Interest with Medicare Benefits
Medicare beneficiaries have a legitimate existing property interest because of
the governing provisions’ intent to reimburse beneficiaries’ use of medical services,
enrollees’ expectations, and the inability to distinguish easily between outpatients
and inpatients.
a. The Intent Behind the Language of the Provisions
In a recent case, Bagnall v. Sebelius, where Medicare beneficiaries argued that
their procedural due process rights were violated, a federal district court held that
the plaintiffs failed to prove that they had an existing property right in formal hos-
pital admission, inpatient status, and Part A benefits.150 The court held that no legiti-
mate entitlement existed because the distribution of benefits is not mandatory.151
After analyzing the applicable statutes and regulations, the court concluded that the
distribution of benefits is only conditional.152 While the court justified its reasoning
by noting that the language in the current governing Medicare provisions fails to in-
clude obligatory words like “must” and “shall,” the court should not have interpreted
the words solely based on their standalone meanings.
Based on recent statements made by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Ser-
vices (CMS) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), it is clear
that the intent of the provisions governing inpatient admission does not permit de-
priving those who receive certain medical services from receiving reimbursements.
This is evident from the May 2013 proposed changes that acknowledge that benefi-
ciaries spending a certain amount of time in a hospital and using certain hospital
147 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
148 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972).
149 Id. As further explained in Bagnall, the court will “look to the statutes, regulations, and
other ‘rules and understandings’ governing the distribution of particular benefits . . . .” 2013
WL 5346659, at *20.
150 Bagnall, 2013 WL 5346659, at *20, *22.
151 Id. at *21.
152 Id. at *22 (“[A]bsence of any ‘must’ or ‘shall’ language makes clear that a physician is
not required to admit a patient if he or she meets the 24-hour benchmark . . . .”).
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services should be entitled to benefits. When describing the motivation behind why
provisional changes have been considered, CMS and HHS recognized that the number
of patients in observation care “has increased from approximately 3 percent in 2006
to approximately 8 percent in 2011,” and how such a trend raises red flags because
of the potential detrimental effects on beneficiaries.153
In Bagnall, the court found that current Medicare policy does not “meaningfully
channel official discretion.”154 However, Bagnall could not consider the proposed
2013 changes to the language of the applicable provisions, which CMS and HHS
announced at the time. If the court considered the proposals in their analysis of Medi-
care’s intent, then the court could have reasoned that CMS and HHS would not
consider provisional changes to ensure that physicians understand how to correctly
use observation status, unless the agencies had both the authority and means to provide
meaningful discretion. Furthermore, before Bagnall the CMS and HHS decided to
“revis[e] hospital inpatient status criteria as one of several policy clarifications or
changes suggested by stakeholders to improve [its] policies governing when a
Medicare beneficiary should be admitted as an inpatient, and how hospitals should
be paid by Medicare for the associated costs they incur.”155 Therefore, these agencies
realized that though initially physicians may make the ultimate decision as to whether
patients are inpatients or placed on observation care, they do so to fit within the de-
fining parameters of the agencies’ overarching policies.156
Furthermore, the Secretary is aware that if patients receive care which satisfies
payment under Medicare Part A, then she must ensure that they are reimbursed, even
if provisional language does not actually use words like “must” and “shall.” The lan-
guage of the proposed changes describes the intent as “we recognize that it would
be helpful to address what the requirements are for Medicare Part A payment and
when a beneficiary should be admitted as a hospital inpatient.”157 The use of the word
“should” in this context, seems to indicate that if a patient satisfies criteria, then a
physician “must” admit that patient as an inpatient and not an observation patient.
Other language also suggests an intent to create obligatory action—the new language
will “state explicitly in our payment regulations that admission pursuant to this order
is the means whereby a beneficiary becomes a hospital inpatient and, therefore, is
153 Medicare Program, 78 Fed. Reg. at 27,644 (proposed May 10, 2013) (to be codified at
42 C.F.R. pts. 412, 462, 485, 489) (“This trend concerns us because of the potential financial
impact on Medicare beneficiaries.”); e.g., Wachter, supra note 9 (“The result of all this angsty
wheel-spinning: the number of obs[ervation] cases in the U.S. went up by 50 percent be-
tween 2006 and 2011, with a more-than-400 percent (!) increase in Medicare patients staying
more than 48 hours under observation.”).
154 2013 WL 5346659, at *23.
155 78 Fed. Reg. at 27,645.
156 In Bagnall, the court held that “[u]ltimately the decision to admit is up to the physician
based on his or her medical judgment.” 2013 WL 5346659, at *23.
157 78 Fed. Reg. at 27,645 (emphasis added).
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required for payment.”158 The use of the word “required” in this context indicates
that once a patient is deemed an inpatient and the applicable order is signed by the
physician, the benefit must be applied. If one looks up the definition of the word “re-
quire”, it will be clear that its meaning is synonymous with that of words like “must”
and “shall” because it creates an obligatory action.159
b. The Expectations of Enrollees
Medicare beneficiaries expect that they will receive benefits upon use of an ap-
plicable medical service. A property interest in Medicare should be recognized
because the program is similar to other benefit programs like welfare. While the court
has found that the similarity does not exist, that is based on superficial comparison
between a complex program and a financial need-based assisted program.
In healthcare, it is not easy to use only objective criteria for eligibility, like income
and welfare programs, without allowing a physician to exercise some discretion.
Therefore, a Medicare beneficiary’s entitlement to a property interest should not be
as strictly construed as that of a financial need-based benefit recipient. The only simi-
larity between the two types of programs is the expectation of enrollees. An individ-
ual enrolls into Medicare with the expectation that if he falls ill and needs certain
medical attention, then he will be reimbursed. That is no different from the individ-
ual who enrolls into a welfare program expecting that as long as her income falls
within a given range, she will receive social assistance. In both situations, the enrollee
is aware that mere enrollment does not always guarantee benefits, but enrollment
coupled with satisfying certain criteria creates a right to benefits.
Medicare enrollees also expect a continuing property interest. In a claim for work-
ers’ compensation payments, the Supreme Court tried to differentiate claims from
continuous payments from claims for payments for a particular incident.160 The court
held that “the law expressly limits an employee’s entitlement to ‘reasonable’ and ‘nec-
essary’ medical treatment, and . . . must be resolved before . . . an employee’s entitle-
ment to benefits [ ] arise.”161 Like the plaintiffs in American Manufacturers Mutual
Insurance Company v. Sullivan, the Court will recognize eligibility for Medicare bene-
fits, but not instant entitlement for Medicare beneficiaries.162 However, the Court’s
concern with necessary and reasonable treatment is a thing in which the case of Medi-
care is easily resolvable. Both CMS and HHS state, “hospital inpatient admissions
are reasonable and necessary based on how long beneficiaries have spent, or are
158 Id. at 27,646 (emphasis added).
159 See, e.g., Require, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/require (last visited May 1, 2015) (“to make it necessary for someone to do something”);
Require, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american
_english/require (last visited May 1, 2015) (“specify as compulsory”).
160 Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 60 (1999).
161 Id.
162 See id. at 61.
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reasonably expected to spend, in the hospital.”163 The proposed benchmarks for
eligibility specify that “Medicare’s external review contractors would presume that
hospital inpatient admissions are reasonable and necessary for beneficiaries who
require more than 1 Medicare utilization day (defined by encounters crossing 2 ‘mid-
nights’) in the hospital receiving medically necessary services.”164
Furthermore, unlike the plaintiffs in Sullivan, a physician assesses Medicare bene-
ficiaries’ use of services simultaneously, not after like in the case of worker’s com-
pensation after an accident. When a physician evaluates an incoming patient, if that
patient is enrolled in a Medicare program, the use of medical services should suffice
to create a valid potential property interest.165 Such a potential property interest should
only be deemed invalid after it is found that a patient did not need the applicable
treatment. The court should exercise greater concern for those treated for extended
periods, but then unable to recover the important financial assistance to subsidize
costs due to trivial decisions.
c. The Public Policy Behind the Provisions
Public policy is another reason why a property interest should not be denied
merely due to the plain language meaning of provisions. During a time when various
stakeholders, agencies, and medical professionals are all unsure as to how to carry
out the applicable provisions fairly, the court should not rely solely on what is written.
If very few beneficiaries, administrators, and facilitators can clearly convey the dis-
tinction between two types of patients, then it is highly unlikely that non-medical
professionals like judges could miraculously do so easily. The medical judgment exer-
cised by physicians to determine who is admitted as an inpatient and who is placed
on observation status is not as objective as the court would like to believe. In fact,
in a report released by the Office of the Inspector General, a study found that the dif-
ference between beneficiaries who were classified as inpatients and those as obser-
vation patients was “clinically indistinguishable.”166 If it is true that inpatient and
observation patients are virtually indistinguishable, then the court should not deny
a property interest merely because some individuals had the unfortunate luck of not
163 78 Fed. Reg. at 27,645.
164 Id.
165 See, e.g., Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 63 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The claimant’s injury cre-
ated a right to have payment despite the fact that it was only a claim for payment, there still
is a valid potential property interest. So the focus should be on whether or not claim pro-
cedures are fair.”).
166 See WRIGHT, supra note 61, at 11 (“Short inpatient stays were often for the same rea-
sons as observation stays.” Similar to beneficiaries in observation stays, “those in short inpatient
stays were most commonly treated for chest pain.”); Wachter, supra note 9 (“To underscore
just how arbitrary the rules regarding observation are, an investigation by the Inspector
General of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services released today found that
‘obs patients’ and ‘inpatients’ were clinically indistinguishable.”).
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being categorized correctly due to error. Therefore, Medicare beneficiaries should
have a valid existing property interest in their benefits due to the intent of provisions,
beneficiaries’ expectations, and unclear differentiation between inpatient admission
and observation status.
2. The Secretary of HHS as a Federal Actor
Now, let us assume that a court could find that a legitimate property interest exists;
the next issue is whether the court could hold the Secretary of HHS responsible for
any procedural due process violations of beneficiaries.167 The Secretary of HHS is
a liable federal actor because, under the “coercive” test, federal oversight plays a
significant role in affecting how physicians classify patients. When a beneficiary
initially enters a hospital, the first person to take a medical evaluation is a licensed
physician. That physician will engage in private action by using his medical knowl-
edge to determine the patient’s classification. The question is then “whether the pri-
vate motives which triggered the enforcement of those laws can fairly be attributed
to the State.”168
In Blum, the Supreme Court laid out three tests to determine when a state or
federal actor should be held responsible for the actions of a private actor and therefore
be subject to the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.169 Under the first test, the plaintiff
must show a “close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regu-
lated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State
itself.”170 Alternatively, a connection can be established under the “coercive power”
test: a showing that the government “exercised coercive power or has provided such
significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be
deemed to be that of the State.”171 The final test is whether a private party is exercis-
ing powers that are “traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.”172 This test
is not applicable in this analysis because there is no evidence showing that physi-
cians make decisions traditionally made exclusively by HHS. So, the responsibility
of the state would need to be found under the first or second test.
a. Satisfying the “Coercive” Test
Under the first test, one could say that physicians act as agents of HHS. How-
ever, the decisions of a patient classifications utilizes their independent medical
judgment, so it is difficult to argue that their thought process is an action that might
167 The Secretary would be a defendant in due process suits because of the role to oversee
agencies administering Medicare. See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text.
168 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
169 Id. at 1004–05.
170 Id. at 1004 (“[T]he question typically is whether the private motives which triggered
the enforcement of those laws can fairly be attributed to the State.”).
171 Id.
172 Id. at 1005 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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as well be conducted by HHS itself. The government could be held responsible under
the second test of “coercive power.” The Court has held that coercion cannot be “[m]ere
approval . . . or acquiescence.”173
A physician must classify incoming patients within the criteria established by
federal regulations. This obligation extends to also complying with hospital protocol
and federal oversight. The government’s oversight of a physician’s diagnosis includes
attaching financial implications on the physician and the hospitals that employ them.174
So, the federal oversight goes beyond “mere approval” and directly affects physi-
cians’ adherence to the overarching regulation of medical services reimbursements by
the government.
Coercive power can also derive from state action that is “‘entwined in [the] man-
agement or control’ of the private actor . . . or is ‘entwined with governmental poli-
cies.’”175 Regulations enforced by Medicare officials and policing bodies, such as the
Recovery Audit Program,176 influence how physicians exercise their medical judg-
ment. “The reality, however, is that hospitals and doctors have been strongly pres-
sured by Medicare to classify more and more people in the hospital as outpatients.”177
This pressure creates structural parameters in which the physicians must exercise
their judgment.178
These parameters derive partly from the financial penalties that burden hospitals
if audits reveal incorrectly distributed reimbursements. While the Blum Court held that
regulations imposing penalties are not sufficient to show state action, the assumption
was that government officials have no power to approve or disapprove physicians’
determinations—they only have the power to disapprove or approve the distribution
of benefits.179 However, physicians have complained that their medical judgment
does not enable them to distinguish clearly between inpatients and outpatients at all
times.180 As a result, if medical judgment fails them, their determinations are likely
173 Id. at 1004–05.
174 Id. at 1005–06.
175 Cranley v. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. of Vt., 318 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2003).
176 Recovery Audit Program, CMS.GOV (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.cms.gov/Research
-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Monitoring-Programs/Medicare-FFS-Compliance-Programs
/Recovery-Audit-Program/?redirect=/recovery-audit-program/.
177 Disappointing Decision from Court in Challenge to “Observation Status” Highlights
Need To Pass Legislation, CTR. FOR MEDICARE ADVOCACY, http://www.medicareadvocacy
.org/disappointing-decision-from-court-in-challenge-to-observation-status-highlights-need
-to-pass-legislation/ (last visited May 1, 2015).
178 See id. (“Medicare also relies on outside corporations’ proprietary guidelines to determine
whether inpatient admissions are ‘appropriate.’ It is these guidelines and Medicare’s enforce-
ment of them that determine admissions in reality.”).
179 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1008–10 (1982) (“[D]ecisions ultimately turn on
medical judgments made by private parties according to professional standards that are not
established by the State.”).
180 See, e.g., Susan Jaffe, Growing Number of Patients Find a Hospital Stay Does Not
Mean They’re Admitted, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 7, 2010), http://kaiserhealthnews.org
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to favor the penalty-free option of just admitting more patients under observation
care. This allows them, along with employing hospitals, to avoid penalization for
incorrectly admitting patients for inpatient care. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that
judgment is confined to only a medical diagnosis. Regulators have intertwined over-
sight with the decision-making process of physicians by heavily scrutinizing the
frequency of inpatient admissions in a particular classification and the resulting
systemic costs.
The increasing trend of physicians labeling patients more frequently with observa-
tion status as a means to avoid penalties also supports the notion of oversight affecting
judgment.181 When the government attaches financial penalties to the classification pro-
cess of patients, the government is no longer playing the indecisive role of “merely re-
sponding to the independent medical judgment of physicians.”182 For example, a
recent study on trends in observation care suggested that between 2007 and 2009 criti-
cal access hospitals were increasingly providing more observation care than other
short-term general hospitals.183 The study concluded that such findings were likely
driven by policies governing hospital reimbursements and patients’ length of stay.184
Another telling sign of this coercive oversight would be the CMS’s own admis-
sion that revision of the applicable provisions was necessary because hospitals were
likely concerned with increasing penalties for failure to administer properly observa-
tion services.185 The CMS explained:
[W]e discussed how the trend towards the provision of extended
observation services may be attributable in part to hospitals’ con-
cerns about Medicare’s payment policy for billing under Part B
/news/hospital-observation-care/ (“Under a set of rather arbitrary definitions, which are very
vague and difficult to understand and apply, [doctors] have to decide who’s an inpatient and
who’s an outpatient . . . .” (quotation marks omitted)).
181 See Zhanlian Feng et al., Sharp Rise in Medicare Enrollees Being Held In Hospitals
For Observation Raises Concerns About Causes And Consequences, 31 HEALTH AFFAIRS
1251, 1256 (2012), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/31/6/12251.full?ikey
=on49LSyrsLkwm&keytype=ref&siteid=healthstaff (“The rising trend of hospital observation
services is consistent with a broader ongoing shift of medicare-covered healthcare services
from inpatient to outpatient settings, fueled in part by Medicare policy measures for cost con-
tainment, such as efforts to crack down on avoidable hospital readmissions.”).
182 Blum, 457 U.S. at 1014–15 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the level-of-care
decisions made in nursing homes had “far less to do with the exercise of independent profes-
sional judgment than they do with the State’s desire to save money”).
183 Brad Wright et al., Trends in Observation Care Among Medicare Fee-for-Service
Beneficiaries at Critical Access Hospitals, 2007–2009, 29 J. RURAL HEALTH s1, s5 (2013)
(“Clinical decision-making should guide the use of observation care, but the trends we ob-
serve in these data suggest that payment policy may also play a significant role.”).
184 Id. at s3–s4.
185 78 Fed. Reg. at 27,486, 27,644 (proposed May 10, 2013) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R.
pts. 412, 462, 485, 489).
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when a Part A hospital inpatient claim is denied because a Medi-
care review contractor determines that the inpatient admission was
not reasonable and necessary under section 1862(a)(1)(A) of the
Act.186
The CMS acknowledged that:
[V]arious stakeholders [informed them] that hospitals appear to
be responding to the financial risk of admitting Medicare benefi-
ciaries for inpatient stays that may later be denied upon contractor
review by electing to treat beneficiaries as outpatients receiving
observation services, often for long periods of time, rather than
admitting them as inpatients.187
State participation was analyzed in the Sixth Circuit. In Wilcher v. City of Akron, the
court held that the plaintiff failed to establish state action because the new cable tele-
vision regulations proposed after public complaints were independently proposed
by the cable television company, not city officials.188 The court reasoned that the
company could only be held a state actor if the plaintiff showed actual participation
by the city officials in the company’s decisionmaking.189 In the present issue, regula-
tors are proposing and implementing regulatory changes due to public pressure; it
is not just encouraging physicians to independently practice more concise medical
judgment. This serves as further evidence that the Secretary of HHS plays a determi-
native role in patients’ classifications as a liable federal actor.
3. Due Process: The Claims Appeal Process and the Mathews Test
In Mathews, the Court established a three element test to analyze whether a federal
actor has created sufficient protections to avoid the deprivation of procedural due
process rights: (1) private interest, (2) sufficient procedural safeguards, and (3) the
government’s interest.190 Unfortunately, Medicare beneficiaries’ due process rights
are not sufficiently protected by current procedural safeguards. Beneficiaries have
the private interest of recovering for medical services they use, as well as for follow-up
care plans prescribed. The current appeals process on paper looks exhaustive, however
it functions with extensive delays that inhibit timely resolution of claim disputes. Last,
the government’s interest is for Medicare to be a viable healthcare coverage option for
eligible enrollees.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 498 F.3d 516, 520 (6th Cir. 2007).
189 Id.
190 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976).
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a. Medicare Beneficiaries’ Private Interest
The first element is what private interest exists for Medicare beneficiaries regard-
ing their entitlement to reimbursements for medical services. In Healey v. Thompson,
a district court found that Medicare beneficiaries do have a “substantial interest in con-
tinued receipt of Medicare benefits.”191 While not involving the absolute termination
of benefits like the plaintiff in Healey, a beneficiary still has the reasonable expecta-
tion that they will continue to receive benefits in the same manner with previous
hospital visits where they sought similar care.192 The potential loss of benefits after
incurring medical expenses may result in a beneficiary’s inability to pay for such
expenses without suffering great financial burden. As discussed in Healey, a “denial
in coverage amounts to denial of services, because [some beneficiaries] may not have
the means to pay for the services.”193 The loss does not only extend to inability to
pay for services, it also extends to denial of continuing care services such as skilled
nursing care, or may affect the ability to afford prescribed pharmaceutical drugs. For
the reasons outlined above, it is clear that Medicare beneficiaries have a strong private
interest in receiving benefits for their use of particular medical services.
b. Erroneous Deprivation Versus Procedural Safeguards
The next element is whether the erroneous deprivation of such interest is suffi-
ciently balanced by the claims appeal process, which is not outweighed by alterna-
tive or substitute procedural safeguards.194 Generally, after a beneficiary’s claim for
benefits has been processed, a notice will be mailed to her regarding the amount of
benefits she recovered. This results in a delay between the time when the beneficiary
receives services and when she is put on notice of the possible reimbursement. To
determine if there is sufficient balance, courts look at the length of the delay and its
reasonableness.195 Due to claims being processed via an outside contractor, a delay
does not seem unreasonable. Furthermore, the CMS has established a five-level
claims appeal system where individuals, hospitals, and other healthcare providers
can dispute claims.196 But, while the system may be a reasonable safeguard to ensure
that errors can be reversed, the practicality of the system is under immense scrutiny.
191 186 F. Supp. 2d 105, 122 (D. Conn. 2001).
192 See id. at n.13 (explaining that an interest can be deemed stronger if the plaintiff had
received such benefits under similar circumstances).
193 Id. at 123.
194 See supra Part V.
195 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 341(“[T]he possible length of wrongful deprivation of . . . benefits
[also] is an important factor in assessing the impact of official action on the private interests.”
(quoting Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
196 See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.
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First, the Chief Judge of the Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals (OMHA)
stated that in 2013, there was a backlog of approximately 357,000 claims.197 The
backlog has burdened the system to the point where the OMHA had to freeze the pro-
cessing of all new claims from healthcare providers and hospitals to increase effi-
ciency.198 To afford protection to individual beneficiaries, who constitute the minority
of appeals claims, the OMHA will prioritize its needs by continuing to review both
backlogged and new appeals claims.199
Though the temporary freeze does not extend to individual Medicare beneficia-
ries, the OMHA still expects that even with a reduced docket, wait times for hear-
ings will continue to take up to as long as a full year.200 Such a delay is unreasonable
and discouraging for needy individual beneficiaries. For example, the Healey court
noted that, “[g]iven the costs of healthcare, and the meager financial resources of many
Medicare beneficiaries, a period of four months without benefits is not insignificant.”201
The Mathews Court also acknowledged that lengthy delays between the different
levels of the appeals system can be quite significant for those whose benefits are er-
roneously terminated.202
Continuing to face delays also burdens beneficiaries because Medicare is their
primary source of benefits. Many individuals do not have alternative funding sources
to supplement denied coverage of healthcare services. This is unlike the terminated
disability recipient who Mathews considers to face hardships, but not to the extent of
other benefit recipients, like welfare recipients, because of access to “private resources
[and] other forms of government assistance.”203 So, notice should not be limited to an
evidentiary hearing to assess errors; initial upfront information regarding admission
status should be mandatory.
Next, the Court found that the “reliability and probative worth of written medical
reports” should be sufficient to support the claim processing decision.204 Physicians’
197 OFFICE OF MEDICARE HEARINGS & APPEALS, MEMORANDUM TO OMHA MEDICARE
APPELLANTS RE: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HEARINGS FOR MEDICARE CLAIM AND
ENTITLEMENT APPEALS (2014), available at http://capsules.kaiserhealthnews.org/wp-content
/uploads/2014/01/nancy-griswold-Medicare-appeals.pdf.
198 Id.; see also Appellant Forum Regarding the Administrative Law Judge Hearing Program
for Medicare Claim Appeals, 79 Fed. Reg. 394 (2014) (stating that the available adjudication
resources is insufficient to meet the demands and workload of addressing appeals).
199 OFFICE OF MEDICARE HEARINGS & APPEALS, supra note 197, at 1.
200 Id. (“[A]verage wait time for a hearing . . . has risen to 16 months and is expected to
continue to increase as the backlog grows.”); see, e.g., Zack Budryk, Hospitals Push To
Clear RAC Appeals Backlog, FIERCEHEALTHCARE (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.fiercehealth
care.com/story/hospitals-push-clear-rac-appeals-backlog/2014-01-16#ixzz2t4zhXUIZ
(explaining that while steps are now being taken to effectuate a speedier process, beneficiaries
must still endure a lengthy wait).
201 Healey v. Thompson, 186 F. Supp. 2d 105, 124 (D. Conn. 2001).
202 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 342 (1976).
203 Id. at 342.
204 Id. at 344 (citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted).
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objective medical judgments are used to justify reimbursing benefits.205 However,
as already discussed, many physicians state that differentiating inpatient from those
only requiring observation care is not based on any accurate medical measurement.206
This has resulted in a lot of erroneous classifications. Mathews set the standard that
due process should be based on “the risk of error inherent in the truthfinding process
as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions.”207 Here, the risk of error
is high because physicians must finalize their classification arbitrarily without ade-
quate means to distinctly separate those only needing observation care and those
who do not.
Last, further proof that the structured procedures cannot properly review claims
is that different levels of the appeals system, like the Qualified Independent Contractor
(QIC) and the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), interpret Medicare policies with dif-
ferent levels of scrutiny. In a 2012 study, the Office of the Inspector General found
that ALJ staff construed provision language less strictly and often favored appellants
“when the intent, but not the letter, of a Medicare policy was met.”208 In contrast, QICs
took the opposite approach and construed language more strictly, only “expecting
to uphold prior-level decisions unless the evidence to reverse [was] compelling.”209
Different scrutiny disadvantages the beneficiary who cannot afford to spend addi-
tional fees and time to keep appealing their dispute until it reaches a more favorable
review stage like the ALJ. Overall, extreme delays and a lack of uniform assessment
of disputes show an insufficient balance of procedural safeguards.
c. The Government’s Interest
The last factor is the government’s interest. The government’s interest in Medicare
strongly favors ensuring eligible beneficiaries receive benefits. One interest concerns
the financial implications of allowing beneficiaries to collect benefits that they may not
necessarily be entitled to. Observation status not only serves as a tool to aid hospitals
with resource distribution, but it also helps limit the amount of government spending
on Medicare.210 On the other hand, if too many beneficiaries are erroneously denied
benefits, then the financial burden shifts to them. This is of great concern because
205 Id.
206 See Jaffe, supra note 180.
207 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344.
208 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED AT THE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW JUDGE LEVEL OF MEDICARE APPEALS 10–11 (2012), available at https://oig.hhs
.gov/oei/reports/oei-02-10-00340.pdf.
209 Id. at 11.
210 For example, in 2011 auditing contractors “identified 888,000 incorrect payments to
hospitals, totaling about $800 million in overpayments . . . . $488 million was returned to the
Medicare Trust Fund . . . .” Joe Carlson, RAC Appeals Backlog Cause For Frustration,
MODERN HEALTHCARE (Jan. 10, 2014), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20140110
/NEWS/301109953.
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Medicare beneficiaries are primarily the elderly, and a significant number live with
chronic illnesses.211 In addition, almost half of beneficiaries live below the 200%
federal poverty line (i.e., 2014 single household income below $23,340).212
The government most likely has an interest in ensuring that Medicare continues
to fulfill its goal by providing reasonable benefits for medical services to alleviate
financial burdens. OMHA already conceded this notion by expressing commitment
to appeals reform to make itself “as responsive as possible to the Medicare beneficiary
community, regardless of the challenges presented.”213 Based on an intent to relieve
the pressure of increasing cases on appeal, and the inability of the different levels of the
appeals to handle a high volume of cases, it is clear that the current system is ineffec-
tive on its own to properly give beneficiaries’ reasonable opportunity to have a dis-
putable claim reviewed in a timely manner.
B. Next Steps: Making the Provisions Implementation More Effective
It should now be clear how arbitrary and confusing Medicare Part A and Part B
provisions can get. The result is unfair financial burdens on Medicare beneficiaries, and
even healthcare providers as well. While some advocates have cried for the removal of
observation care altogether, the process of triaging patients early on in their hospital
visit is an important way to increase the efficiency of delivery and quality of healthcare
services.214 Fortunately, certain actions may improve this classification process.
More detailed drafting and mandatory notice to beneficiaries while they are in
hospital can clarify provisional intent. The provisions’ lack of clarity is a major nega-
tive aspect. While the change to use of an objective measurement of time to differen-
tiate patients is clearer, in the realm of medicine it is still a very superficial and
arbitrary means to differentiate the level of a patient’s medical need. The CMS and
HHS could be even more definitive by listing specific types of diagnoses and treat-
ments that would make one eligible for inpatient status. Categorization of the different
kinds of diagnosis will allow physicians to use their medical judgment effectively,
but still objectively identify whether inpatient services are necessary. For example,
person A and B could both have stayed in the hospital for less than 48 hours because
of high blood pressure, but A needed a more extensive prescription due to poorer
health. Such factors could be used to take someone out of observation status despite
211 See AARP PUB. POLICY INST., THE MEDICARE BENEFICIARY POPULATION (2009),
available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/health/fs149_medicare.pdf.
212 Federal Poverty Guidelines, FAMILIESUSA (Feb. 2014), http://www.familiesusa.org
/resources/tools-for-advocates/guides/federal-poverty-guidelines.html.
213 Susan Jaffe, As HHS Moves to End Overload of Medicare Claims Appeals, Bene-
ficiaries Will Get Top Priority, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Jan. 21, 2014), http://www.kaiser
healthnews.org/stories/2014/january/21/medicare-claims-appeals-backlog-after-suspension/.
214 But see LAN ZHAO ET AL., AARP PUB. POLICY INST., RAPID GROWTH IN MEDICARE
HOSPITAL OBSERVATION SERVICES: WHAT’S GOING ON?, (2013) (arguing that this efficiency
is only in “relatively short observation stays of 12–24 hours in dedicated units”).
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having stayed in hospital for less than the two night requirement.215 Furthermore, au-
diting contractors will have a harder time over-scrutinizing admissions because of
a clearly outlined medical basis.216
The Bagnall court has indicated that entitlement is more than meeting certain
requirements.217 Though this Note argues that a legitimate entitlement to Medicare
benefits already exists, the CMS should make the applicable provisional language
more definitive of the programs intent. This means using language like “a doctor ‘must’
or ‘shall’ if a patient exhibits x, y, and z.” Therefore, when adjudicating claims, bene-
ficiaries’ suits will not be dismissed prematurely. The provisions should also allude
to another important step in the classification process—formal notice from physi-
cians to beneficiaries. It is important that beneficiaries receive notice on their status
and its implications before discharge from the hospital. Many patients express shock
when they learn that the services they received did not constitute inpatient care sub-
sequent to their discharge.218 A simple solution would be to create a standard form
relaying information to the patient about their classification and the coverage effects.
The positive result of formal notification is that beneficiaries are likely to accept the
physician’s determination. Just like in the case of informed consent, studies show
when there is more transparency regarding a patient’s treatment, the physician faces
less instances of liability.219 By enabling beneficiaries to participate in the classifica-
tion process earlier on, it is likely that they will not feel cheated or mislead.
Overall, by increasing clarity of language to show exact intent, by expanding the
language to accommodate various health conditions, and by creating a formal pro-
cess to relay preliminary information to beneficiaries, observation status can be used
effectively.
CONCLUSION
Covering over fifty million seniors, Medicare’s wide-ranging coverage should
continue to administer benefits that are fair and just, and of valuable assistance to
215 See, e.g., Wachter, supra note 9 (suggesting remodeling the payment systems by
codifying services instead of merely relying on hours spent in the hospital).
216 See, e.g., id. (“After all, with the two-midnight rule, it’s likely that RAC auditors will
be suspicious (potentially with some justification) that hospitals will keep some patients an
extra midnight.”).
217 Bagnall v. Sebelius, No 3:11CV1703 (MPS), 2013 WL 5346659, at *20 (D. Conn.
Sept. 23, 2013).
218 See, e.g., Schorsch, supra note 1 (quoting the daughter of an eighty-three-year-old who
“got caught in the loophole” when he unknowingly was forced to pay $7,360 out of his own
pocket).
219 See, e.g., Lawrence H. Brenner et al., Beyond Informed Consent: Educating the Patient,
467 CLINICAL ORTH. & RELATED RES. 348 (2009) (concluding that studies involving informed
consent do not take into account patients’ education level); R.A. Caplan, Informed Consent:
Patterns of Liability from the ASA Closed Claims Project, 64 ASA NEWSLETTER 7 (2000)
(explaining studies involving inability in informed consent cases).
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beneficiaries. The current provisions for inpatient admission violate procedural due
process rights because all Medicare beneficiaries have an existing property interest.
Strong federal oversight of the distribution of benefits shows federal action in the vio-
lation. Furthermore, the appeals claim system is an inadequate procedural safeguard
due to its inability to review claims in a timely manner and with consistent scrutiny.
While observation care serves an important means to increase the efficiency of health-
care delivery, it should not be used to disadvantage beneficiaries. To avoid viable due
process claims, regulators should clarify provisional language, codify health conditions,
as well as mandate initial notice to make the observation care nightmare go away.
